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1  Introduction 
A reserve crisis is a lack of nominal means of payment preventing otherwise risk-free debt 
from being repaid at par in one country. The International Gold Standard (1821-1931) was a 
period of severe and frequent crises associated with scarce stocks of reserves. This period was 
characterized by a fixed exchange rate regime in which countries redeemed domestic currencies 
in gold, with the United Kingdom as the world's financial center. Could a reserve crisis in one 
country have affected output and welfare in another country through the operations of 
international financial markets during the International Gold Standard? And, during the same 
period, what were the implications of sharing a common outside currency in the transmission of 
reserve crises across countries? This paper constitutes an effort to answer these questions by 
focusing on the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the questions 
considered in this paper are of more than just historical interest, especially considering that in 
the past decade, economies open to international capital flows
1 have been -and still are- in the 
process of moving away from adjustable pegs (e.g. crawling pegs), some toward harder pegs to 
the currency of a financial center (e.g., currency boards or arrangements with no separate legal 
tender), but more towards systems with greater exchange rate flexibility. Thus, the questions 
raised in this paper are also relevant to current issues concerning monetary integration, its costs, 
and its benefits, as well as the impact of policies implemented by the current financial center, 
the United States. Moreover, these topics are of immediate concern to countries that are already 
members of the European Union, but also to the many countries that are currently evaluating 
whether to peg their national currencies in favor of the currency of a financial center: most 
recently to the dollar and probably the euro in the near future. 
                                                 
1 These are, mostly, economies classified as developed markets and emerging markets by the IMF. See Fischer 
(2001).  
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Bordo (1984) argues that, during the International Gold Standard, declines (rises) of the 
domestic money stock led to increases (falls) in short-term interest rates and, consequently 
inflows (outflows) o f reserves from abroad. Huffman and Lothian (1984), when analyzing 
historical data for the United Kingdom and the United States, found a clear association between 
decreases in the rate of growth of money and output: 
“… In almost all of the episodes a clear-cut association is evident 
between monetary decelerations and movements in output. That association, 
moreover, does not appear to be simply a reflection of reverse causation.”
2 
These authors also point out two additional findings. First, the magnitude of  the 
reductions in the money supply conformed to the severity of the decline in output. Second, 
flows of specie-reserves and price and capital-market adjustments played an essential role in 
the transmission across countries of these monetary and real downturns. 
In contrast to the studies described, this paper focuses on output declines associated 
with reductions in the stocks of reserves, not reductions in the overall money supply. The paper 
can be thought of as comparing the experiences of the United Kingdom and the United States in 
two different periods with two distinct international monetary arrangements: the Antebellum 
period (before 1862) and the Greenback period (1862-1879). During both periods the United 
Kingdom was the world’s financial center. In both periods there were financial crises in which 
the origin of the business contractions was a drain of specie-reserves in the United Kingdom, 
followed by a reaction of the Bank of England
3. However, the periods mentioned were 
characterized by different international monetary regimes: during the Antebellum period both 
countries were on gold, while during the Greenback period only one country (the United 
                                                 
2 Huffman and Lothian (1984), pp. 478-479. 
3 While the historical evidence presented in Bordo (1984) and Huffman and Lothian (1984) can be thought as 
relevant to the purpose of this paper, I do restrict my attention only to crises that originated by drain of reserves in 
the United Kingdom only for the purpose of comparability.  
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Kingdom) was on gold. As we can see in Tables 1 and 2, only during the Antebellum period, 
when both countries were on gold, do we observe that monetary and business contractions 
spread from the United Kingdom (the financial center) to the United States. In contrast, in the 
business contraction of 1866
4 (during the Greenback period), the United States was off of gold 
and the monetary and business contraction that originated in the United Kingdom was confined 
to that country. 
To address the questions posed, I model two countries, a financial center (United 
Kingdom) and a financial periphery (United States), under two monetary regimes: a common 
international currency versus separate national currencies. I build a model of an open economy 
payments system: how payments are made, cleared, and settled between residents of different 
countries, and in which payments may involve multiple currencies. The focus is on financial 
crises caused by the inadequate supply of the means of payment (reserves), without which 
otherwise risk-less debts fail to be repaid at par (see Freeman, 1996a). This failure, in turn, 
affects the payments to factors of production (e.g. wages), with consequent real effects. 
Freeman (2002) showed that output can be low simply because the nominal stock of 
reserves available is too low. Freeman’s result raises the question of whether international 
financial integration can help: is it possible to (partially or totally) overcome this nominal 
constraint on output through free access to international financial markets in a world with a 
common currency? As I show, the possibility of reserves-sharing between a financial center 
(the United Kingdom) and a periphery (the United States) helps the periphery to increase output 
by importing (gold) reserves when its nominal money supply would otherwise be low. 
However, a reserve crisis originated in the United Kingdom is transmitted to the United States. 
                                                 
4 The crisis of 1866 was the only crisis, during the Greenback period, originated by a drain of specie reserves in 
the United Kingdom.  
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These results help us understand the historical evidence for the United Kingdom and the United 
States during the Antebellum period. 
How this situation differs from the one arising in the presence of two country-specific 
currencies depends on the presence or absence of foreign exchange controls. When there are 
strong limitations on the use of foreign currency in the domestic country, the nominal 
constraint on output in the financial periphery (the United States) can not be overcome: no 
trade occurs in the foreign exchange markets, there is financial autarky and the domestic output 
can be constrained by the nominal stock of domestic reserves. However, a reserve crisis 
originated in the United Kingdom is not transmitted to the United States. These results help us 
understand the historical evidence for the United Kingdom and the United States during the 
Greenback period. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I examine in more detail the historical 
observations for the United Kingdom and the United States during the International Gold 
Standard on crises that originated by a drain of reserves from the United Kingdom. In Section 
3, I present a two-country, single currency model of an international payments system. I then 
argue that international financial integration works to some extent to provide an “elastic 
currency” when some specific institutional arrangements are present. In Section 4, I consider a 
world with country-specific currencies, flexible exchange rates, and  controls on foreign 
exchange. Finally, in Section 5, I match the historical evidence with the theoretical results 
found in Sections 3 and 4, and I present the main conclusions of the analysis. 
2  Reserve Crises during the International Gold Standard
5 
The United Kingdom resumed gold convertibility in 1821 after the Napoleonic wars and 
remained continuously on gold until 1914. The United States established a  de facto gold 
                                                 
5 For a general reference to the history of this period, see Huffman and Lothian (1984), Martin (1968 and 1973), 
Temin (1969) and Timberlake (1961).  
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standard in 1834. However, the United States was off gold for a period of seventeen years 
known as the Greenback period (1862-1879). This section presents the experiences of the 
United Kingdom and the United States in two distinct periods: the Antebellum period (before 
1862) and the Greenback period (1862-1879). I restrict my attention to these two periods, since 
they share the common characteristic that the United Kingdom was the world’s financial center. 
In addition, in both periods there were crises originated by a drain of specie-reserves in the 
United Kingdom, followed by a reaction of the Bank of England. 
2.1  The Antebellum period 
Table 1 presents information on the four crises that took place during the Antebellum period 
when both the United Kingdom and the United States were on gold: 1836, 1839, 1845 and 
1856. These Antebellum crises share the following stylized facts: a drain of specie reserves in 
the United Kingdom was followed by (or coincident with) a business contraction there and a 
reaction by the Bank of England. The immediate effect was gold inflows from the United States 
to the United Kingdom, which caused a contraction in the specie stock and a financial crisis in 
the United States due to the lack of means of payments. The latter was followed by or 
coincident with a business contraction in the United States, which, in most of the cases, was 
more severe than the one in the United Kingdom. Hence, when both countries were on gold, it 
is noticeable that the  scarcity of specie as means of payments w as transmitted from the 
financial center (where they originated) to the financial periphery, with the subsequent 
transmission of the associated business contractions. 
The policies implemented by the Bank of England during this period can be classified 
as follows: an increase in discount rates, quantitative restrictions or a suspension of the Bank 
Charter of 1844 (known as Peel’s Act). The discount rate was the tool used by the Bank of 
England when trying to sterilize gold flows by buying or selling domestic securities.  
  7 
Quantitative controls were used by the Bank of England as an attempt to restrict lending to the 
United States: the Bank of England would refuse to discount the bills of joint-stock banks or to 
handle acceptances of Anglo-American discount houses, even at the higher rates of interest, as 
observed in 1836. Finally, a suspension of the Bank Charter of 1844 would allow the Bank of 
England to issue “uncovered” notes, a policy somehow close to an elastic currency regime. 
This policy was in operation during the crises of 1845 and 1856. 
The model that I present in Section 3 will be consistent with these facts. In that 
environment, unforeseen shocks that reduce the availability of reserves in the financial center 
are transmitted to the periphery when there is reserves-sharing and a common outside currency. 
This shock causes reductions in output both in the center and the periphery. 
2.2  The Greenback period 
Table 2 shows the sequence of events during the only reserve crisis that originated in the 
United Kingdom during the Greenback period, in 1866. The origin of the contraction was a 
drain of specie reserves in the Bank of England, followed by a sharp increase in the British 
discount rates. However, the monetary and business contraction that followed in the United 
Kingdom did not spread to the United States. The model presented in Section 4 of this paper is 
consistent with these facts. In that environment, the effects of liquidity shocks are confined to 
the financial center in the absence of reserves-sharing, when there are country-specific outside 
currencies and full foreign currency controls. 
3  A Single Currency World 
In this section, I present a two-country model of an international payments system: the United 
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Henceforth, the sub index 1 will be associated with 
the US and the sub index 2 will be associated with the UK. Each country, in autarky, has the 
features introduced by Freeman (2002): a production economy with a payments system and a  
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financial sector (bankers). Both countries share a fixed stock of outside currency, which I call 
gold but which has no intrinsic value
6. The two countries are identical in every respect but in 
the size of their financial sector and in the fact that only the UK’s agents face s tochastic 
fluctuations in the availability of reserves (liquidity)
7. The US is the financial periphery and the 
UK is the financial center. The UK is the financial center because it has a larger volume of 
reserves to cover the needs of trade. For simplicity, I assume that the volume of trade in both 
countries is normalized to be equal. In this case,  the UK’s financial sector (population of 
bankers) is larger than the US’s. 
3.1  Endowments, preferences and production 
A constant number of two period-lived heterogeneous agents are born every period in each 
country. In each country there is a central island surrounded by groups of outer islands. A 
central island is the only place where all contracts can be enforced and where a monetary 
authority resides. 
In each country, there are three types of agents in each generation: capitalists, debtors 
and bankers. Each of these types lives on a separate outer island. Thus, in Country i (i=1,2), 
there is a continuum of capitalists with unit mass, a continuum of debtors with unit mass, and a 
continuum of bankers with mass  i y . I assume that  1 1 < y . We will see that in equilibrium, this 
assumption implies that the US is liquidity constrained in autarky: gold reserves will be 
insufficient to settle all debt at par. In addition, since the UK is the financial center, I assume 
that  2 1 y y < . 
Each capitalist in each country is endowed when young with one unit of a specific good, 
and with an investment technology that allows her to transform one unit of the endowment 
                                                 
6 It is easy to “marry” the economy considered here with the commodity money model of Sargent and Wallace 
(1983). For simplicity, I do not do that here. 
7 This assumption is just a normalization that allows me to focus on reserve crises that originate in the UK.  
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good at time t (only if saved) into one unit of physical capital at t+1. When old she can use this 
capital together with hired labor to produce  ) , ( 1 , + t i it L k F  units of a final good, where  it k  and 
1 , + t i L  denote, respectively, physical capital and labor used by a capitalist born in Country i at t. 
( ) .,. F  is a constant returns to scale and twice continuously differentiable production function 
with the following properties:  0 > K F ,  0 > L F ,  0   and,   , 0   , 0 > < < KL LL KK F F F . I also assume 
that both physical capital and labor are essential for production. Note that the investment and 
the production technologies are homogeneous across countries. Finally, the initial old 
capitalists in both countries are endowed with  0 0 > k  units of physical capital each. 
Each debtor and banker is endowed with one unit of non-storable labor when young 
(and nothing when old). Labor is homogeneous across countries and agent types. 
A capitalist born in Country i at t only wishes to consume when old the final good he 
produces ( 1 ,
~
+ t i c ). Her utility is monotonically increasing in this argument. A debtor born in 
Country  i wishes to consume only the capitalist’s endowment good when young ( it c ) and 
nothing when old; her utility is monotonically increasing in this argument. Finally, a banker 
born in Country  i consumes only the services produced by other people’s labor when old 
( 1 , + t i n ), and h er utility is monotonically increasing in this argument. F or simplicity, I will 
assume that each agent’s utility is linear in its arguments. 
In the initial period, there exists a fixed stock of M units of gold in the world, which is 
distributed equally among the initial old capitalists and bankers. 
3.2  Interaction between countries and trade and travel patterns 
As I mentioned before, investment and production technologies are homogeneous across 
countries. However, I henceforth focus on the case in which the capitalists’ endowment good, 
physical capital, and the capitalists’ final good are island-specific. Therefore, the capitalists’  
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endowment good, physical capital, and the capitalists’ final good are not internationally mobile: 
domestic young agents cannot lend/borrow from the rest of the world, there is no international 
trade of goods, and physical capital is country-specific. This assumption
8 allows me to focus on 
the analysis of international flows of financial capital (gold reserves): there is free mobility of 
gold reserves across countries. In addition, for pedagogical purposes I allow labor to be freely 
mobile across countries, so that wages are equalized across all locations
9. 
It is crucial to notice that each period has two parts. During the first part, we will 
observe only intra generational trade: a young agent trades with other young agents in the outer 
islands, and an old agent trades with other old agents at either one of the central islands. During 
the second part of the period both intra and inter generational trade will take place: an old agent 
trades with other old agents at either one of the central islands, and then young workers trade 
with old agents. 
In addition, notice that when old, all the agents must travel to a central island. There are 
two elements to keep in mind as you read the description of the timing of events that will 
follow: first, the arrivals of the different types of old agents will not be synchronized, creating 
problems for both debt clearing and the payment to the factors of production. Second, note that 
the bilateral clearing of debt would require that the old debtors bring enough gold balances to 
the central island while the old capitalists are there. Bilateral clearing of debt will not always be 
possible, and, thus debt will be cleared by third parties (banks). 
I now describe the timing of events and the nature of transactions within a period. 
First part of the period. At the beginning of each period, trade in the capitalists’ endowment 
good takes place in both countries. Young debtors would like to buy some of this good from the 
                                                 
8 It can be shown that relaxing this assumption does not alter the nature of the results presented in this paper. A 
proof is available by request from the author. 
9 Similar results would be obtained without international labor mobility, since the demand for labor is 
internationally mobile. A proof is available by request from the author.  
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young capitalists of their country. To do so, they issue debt for the nominal value of the amount 
of the good they want to purchase, to be repaid in gold (money)
10. The young capitalists accept 
this debt in exchange for part of their endowment good, and invest the rest in capital. The 
young debtors then go back to their island with the amount of the capitalists’ endowment good 
they purchased and consume it. 
The old capitalists travel to the central island in their country. They can stay at a central 
island only for the first part of the period. However, at this time, none of the US’s old debtors 
have arrived yet, while only a fraction lt+1 of the UK’s old debtors have arrived at their own 
country’s central island. This is the lack of synchronicity in arrival times mentioned before. 
Thus, the bilateral clearing of debt cannot occur at this time. The serially uncorrelated random 
variable  lt+1 has a strictly stationary distribution with support on the interval (0, 1). The 
realization of lt+1 is known at the beginning of period t+1. Notice that lt+1 will represent the 
availability of reserves in the financial center at  t+1. As mentioned before, we use a 
normalization that makes the two countries different in the following sense: only the financial 
center displays random changes in the availability of reserves, so that we can focus on reserve 
crises that originated in the UK. 
At the same time, the old bankers arrive at a central island. The old bankers can wait for 
the remainder of the old debtors to arrive during the next part of the period, while the old 
capitalists cannot. The old capitalists, instead of going back home with no gold balances, sell 
the debt in their hands to the old bankers in exchange for gold. Profit seeking by the bankers 
gives room for a resale market for debt to open. Moreover, the old bankers from either country 
are free to take reserves to any central island they want. Therefore, the old bankers use gold 
                                                 
10 It may be useful to note at this point that in this environment, in equilibrium, the interest rate on the debt issued 
by the young debtors will be fixed by the rate of return on money (gold). Therefore, it will be the price of the 
young capitalists’ endowment good that will adjust to clear the market for loans. This will occur because in each 
country the young debtors will use the loans only to purchase the goods of the island-specific capitalists’ 
endowment good in their own country.  
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balances (reserves) to purchase debt from the old capitalists until the resale price of the debt is 
equalized across central islands. Figure 1 illustrates the transactions performed by the old 
agents during the first part of a period. 
Notice that a lack of nominal means of payment may arise during the first part of a 
period at the world level. Specifically, there is a shortage of liquidity if the total reserves 
available in both central islands
11 are scarce relative to the face value of the not-yet-settled debt 
held by the old capitalists of both countries, and this is related to the value of the realization of 
1 + t l : a low realization of  1 + t l  is associated with low availability of reserves for the clearing of 
debt. At the end of this part, the old capitalists sell their debt to the old bankers and go back to 
their island with the gold received. The old bankers stay on the central island waiting for the 
remaining old debtors to arrive. 
Second part of the period. At the beginning of the second part of a period, the remaining old 
debtors arrive at their own country’s central island and repay their debt to the old bankers. 
Next, all the old agents go back to their own islands and the competitive labor market opens. 
Notice that the debt needs to be cleared before the labor market opens because both old bankers 
and old capitalists must carry gold balances in order to purchase labor. Figure 2 illustrates the 
transactions performed by the old agents during the second part of a period, before the labor 
market opens. 
Finally, the labor market opens. Free mobility of labor across countries implies that 
young debtors and young bankers travel to the old capitalists' and old bankers' islands either in 
their own country or in the foreign country to supply labor inelastically in exchange for gold. 
Also, the nominal wage rate is equalized across both islands and countries. The old bankers 
purchase labor for consumption. The old capitalists use both the labor they purchased this 
                                                 
11 The total reserves available in both central islands at this time are given by the total of gold balances held by the 
old bankers.  
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period and the capital they invested in when young to produce the final good and they consume 
it. 
3.3  Equilibrium 
3.3.1  Behavior of individual agents 
Debtors. Let  it p  denote the unit price (in gold) of the capitalists’ endowment good faced by a 
young debtor born in Country i at time t, and  it c  her consumption of this good. Let  it w  be the 
nominal wage in Country i at t,  it d  the nominal value of the debt issued by a young debtor born 
in Country i at t, and  it m  her nominal balances of gold. The collapsed budget constraints that 
describe the debtor’s behavior are: 
) 1 (                2 , 1      ,   = = = = i w m d c p it it it it it  
Capitalists. Let  it s  be the nominal value of the debt accepted by a young capitalist born in 
Country i at t and let  it k  be her investment in physical capital. A young capitalist born in 
Country i at t can either invest her endowment of the island-specific good or sell it to a young 
debtor. Her budget constraint is 






Define  1 , + t i L  to be the amount of labor that a capitalist born in Country i at t buys when 
old and let  1 , + t i q  be the resale price of the debt on Country i’s central island at time t+1. The 
budget constraints that define the purchases of labor by an old capitalist born in the US at t and 
an old capitalist born in the UK at t are, respectively 
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An old capitalist born in Country i at t will use physical capital and labor to produce an 
island-specific final good. Let  it c ~  denote her consumption of this good. Then 
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A capitalist born in the US maximizes (4) subject to (2) and (3a), taking  1 , 1 + t q ,  t p1  and 
1 , 1 + t w  as given. The (interior) solution for this problem is described by: 
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Similarly, a capitalist born in the UK maximizes (4) subject to (2) and (3b) taking  1 , 2 + t q , 
t p2  and  1 , 2 + t w  as given. The (interior) solution for this problem is described by: 
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Equations (5a) and (5b) require that the expected return on physical capital equals the 
expected return on gold-reserves. 
Bankers. Let 
*
it m  be the nominal balances of gold held by a young banker born in Country i at 
t. A young banker supplies labor inelastically in exchange for gold. Hence, the budget 
constraint faced by a young banker born in Country i is: 
(6)                    2 , 1      ,  
* = = i w m it it  
When old, a banker born in Country i will use her balances of gold to purchase debt 
from the old capitalists. She can take any fraction  [ ] 1 , 0 1 , ˛ + t i x  of her gold balances (reserves) to 
the other country’s central island and purchase foreign debt, using the remaining reserves to 
acquire domestic debt. Once the old debtors repay their debt, an old banker born in Country i  
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will spend all the profits earned in purchasing labor. She can buy labor from any country she 
wants. Let  1 , + t i n  be the total consumption of labor by an old banker born in Country i at t. The 
budget constraint of an old banker is given by: 
( )
























n w  
3.3.2  Market clearing conditions
12 
There is a single world market for labor. This market clears when the world aggregate supply 
of labor equals the world aggregate demand for labor: 
( ) (8)                      2 1 , 2 2 1 , 1 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 1 + + + + + + + = + + t t t t n y n y L L y y  
On the other hand, in this environment the young workers (debtors and bankers) are the 
only holders of gold balances. Therefore, as a result of a single world market for labor, the 
market for gold is also integrated at the world level. This market clears when the world 
aggregate demand for gold equals the world fixed supply: 




1 1 2 1 M m y m y m m t t t t = + + +  
Equations (1), (6) and (9) imply that 
( ) ( ) (10)                1 1 2 2 1 1 M w y w y t t = + + +  
In addition, free international mobility of the labor supply and competitive  markets imply 
nominal wage equalization across countries, so that 
( )





w w w t t t "
+ +
= = =  
                                                 
12 It can be shown that all the results in this section and in the remaining sections hold also for the case when no 
mobility of the labor supply is allowed across countries. We can assume international mobility in either labor 
supply or labor demand. Therefore, mobility of old bankers (labor demand) is sufficient, without mobility of 
workers (labor supply). A proof is available by request from the author.  
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However, the demand for the capitalists’ endowment good is island-specific. This 
implies that the domestic markets for loans are not internationally integrated. Therefore, 
Country i’s market for loans clears when 
(12)               2 , 1     ,   = = i s d it it  
In equilibrium, the old bankers transfer reserves across central islands until the resale 
price of the debt is equalized across countries: 
(13)            1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 ‡ " = = + + + t q q q t t t  
Also, in equilibrium, the debt offered by the old capitalists cannot exceed the balances 
of gold brought to the central islands by the old bankers. Therefore, at time t+1, the resale 
market for debt clears when 




1 1 2 1 1 1 t t t t t t m y m y s s q + £ - + + + l  
Equation (14) holds with strict equality if there is a shortage of reserves with which to 
clear the debt: 




1 1 2 1 1 t t t t t m y m y s s + > - + + l  
If this is the case, the debt is sold at a discount ( 1 0 1 < < + t q ). It follows that there is a shortage 
of reserves with which to clear the debt at period t+1 when: 
(16)                   ) 2 ( ) ( 1 2 1 + - < + t y y l  
If (16) holds for all possible realizations of lt+1, we say that the world economy is liquidity-
constrained. In contrast, we say that there are plentiful reserves in the central islands when 




1 1 2 1 1 t t t t t m y m y s s + £ - + + l  
In this case, debt is sold at par (qt+1=1), and the value of debt sold clears this market. Thus, 
there are plentiful reserves at t+1 if 
( ) (18)                      ) 2 ( 1 2 1 + - ‡ + t y y l   
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If equation (18) holds for all the possible realizations of lt+1, we say that the world economy is 
not liquidity-constrained. The analysis that follows focuses on the case in which (16) holds, i.e., 
the world economy is liquidity-constrained for all the relevant values of lt+1. 
Finally, for a given  1 + t q , the short-run gross interest rate (liquidity premium) prevailing 
on the central islands between the departure of the old capitalists and the arrival of the old 







t q . 
3.3.3  General equilibrium 
The proof of the following proposition is straightforward and it is not included here. 
Proposition 1 In the liquidity-constrained world-integrated equilibrium with a common outside 
currency, the following holds as a result of arbitrage in the resale market for debt: a) the 
financial center shares gold-reserves with the financial periphery, and b) the liquidity premium 
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Thus, in equilibrium, the choice of physical capital by a capitalist born in the US at t is 
given by: 
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while the equilibrium choice of physical capital by a capitalist born in the UK at t is: 
(19b)                  
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Moreover, it also follows from Proposition 1 that, in equilibrium, the consumption of 
labor by old bankers born at t is equalized across countries:  
 18 
(20)                    
1 1
1 , 2 1 , 1
+ +
+ + = =
t t
t
t t q w
w
n n  
3.3.4  Steady-state equilibrium 
In equilibrium, there is ex-ante and ex-post wage equalization across countries. Moreover, the 
nominal wage is constant over time. In addition, while the financial center (UK) shares gold-
reserves with the periphery (US) during the first part of each period, nominal wage equalization 
across countries and a constant wage rate imply a constant end-of-period supply of gold in each 
country. Therefore, for any given initial distribution of the world supply of gold, no 
redistribution of wealth (gold) across countries occurs in equilibrium and the world economy 
remains in a (stochastic) steady-state equilibrium after the first period. 
3.4  Optimality 
In this section, I state the conditions that must be satisfied by a Golden Rule allocation in the 
world economy. Then I compare the steady-state integrated competitive equilibrium with a 
common outside currency with the Golden Rule allocation. 
3.4.1  The Golden Rule 
Consider a benevolent social planner that maximizes a weighted average of the agents’ steady-
state utility, subject only to feasibility constraints
13. This problem may be stated as follows: 
( ) ( )
(24)                2                  
(23)                                           2                  
(22)                         , , ~ ~                . .
(21)                      ~ ~      
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where  j g , j=1, 2, …, 6, are arbitrary weights. For the world economy to reach the Golden Rule 
allocation, the following must hold: 
                                                 
13 The planner is not constrained by the timing of the transfers or by any settlement rule.  
 19 
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GR
i L  denote Country i’s allocation of physical capital and labor, respectively, 
under the Golden Rule. Hence, when the world economy is in the Golden Rule allocation, the 
ratio of marginal product of labor to marginal product of capital in both countries must be 
equal. 
3.4.2  Integrated competitive equilibrium and the Golden Rule 
In this section, for the sake of comparability, I consider a steady-state competitive equilibrium 
where the young agents born at  t know the value of  lt+1 at the moment of making their 
decisions. 
Proposition 2 The liquidity-constrained world-integrated steady-state competitive equilibrium 
with a common outside currency does not satisfy the Golden Rule. 
Proof: In the steady-state competitive equilibrium, the following holds: 
[ ]
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From (25), (26a) and (26b), a necessary condition for the competitive equilibrium to 
coincide with the Golden Rule is the following: 
[ ] (27)          ) 1 (
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However, from (1), (2), (11), (12), (19a) and (19b), equation (27) is satisfied if and only 
if 
(28)        1 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 = = = + + + t t t q q q  
and p1t=p2t. Combining (1), (2), (11) and (12), I get:  
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Thus, for  t t p p 2 1 =  also  t t k k 2 1 =  is needed. From (19a) and (19b), this is true only 
when (28) holds. 
Therefore, for the world economy to reach the Golden Rule allocation, not only must 
there be international financial integration, but in addition the nominal constraint on output (the 
liquidity constraint) must not be operative. The latter is not true in the integrated equilibrium 
when the world economy is liquidity-constrained. Q.E.D. 
3.5  The  effects of unanticipated drains of reserves from the 
United Kingdom 
This section discusses the effects, in a (stochastic) steady state, of an unanticipated drain of 
reserves from the UK on both capital-based output and profits earned by the reserves-holding 
sector
14. The analysis in this section focuses on the consequences of innovations in lt, which 
represent unforeseen and unpredictable changes in the availability of reserves in the financial 
center (UK) at time t. Notice that a reduction in lt is equivalent to a drain of the reserves 
available for the purchase of debt in the financial center at t. Moreover, when the shock is 
realized at the beginning of time t, the physical capital stock has already been chosen. Thus, the 
stock of physical capital used by the old capitalists to produce their final good at t will not be 
affected. 
Let Yit denote the stationary real capital-based output in Country i at time t. Then 
(30)                    2 , 1 ,    ) , ( = ” i L k F Y it i it . 
                                                 
14 Capital-based output refers to the production of the island-specific final good by an old capitalist. Old bankers 
constitute the reserves-holding sector.  
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Proposition 3 In the liquidity-constrained world-integrated equilibrium with a common outside 
currency, unforeseen drains of reserves from the financial center (innovations that reduce lt) 
reduce (capital-based) output not only in the financial center but also in the periphery. 
Proof: A sufficient condition for Proposition 3 to hold is that Y1t and Y2t are increasing 
in lt. Given the fact that  i k  remains constant when unforeseen changes in  t l  occur, it is easy to 
show that 






















Notice that, in the (stochastic) steady-state equilibrium,  ) 2 /( ) ( 2 1 1 t t y y L l - + =  and 















. Hence, it follows that 























Next, define Pit as the gross real profits earned by the owners of gold-reserves (old 
bankers) in Country i at time t: 
(33)                  2 , 1 ,     = ” P i n y it i it  
Proposition 4 In the liquidity constrained world-integrated equilibrium with a common outside 
currency, unforeseen drains of reserves from the financial center (innovations that reduce lt) 
increase the gross real  profits earned by the reserves-holding sector in both the financial 
center and periphery. 
Proof: A sufficient condition for Proposition 4 to hold is that P1t and P2t are decreasing in lt. 
Using (33), it is easy to show that  
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Notice t hat, from (20), in the (stochastic) steady-state equilibrium 



































Thus, an unforeseen drain of reserves from the UK (financial center) is transmitted to 
the US (financial periphery) when there is international financial integration (reserves-sharing) 
and a common international currency. This shock causes a reduction in (capital-based) output 
not only in the UK (center) but also in the US (periphery). In contrast, the owners of gold-
reserves in both countries benefit from this kind of shock. Notice that these results are 
consistent with the historical evidence presented in Section 2 for the Antebellum period. 
3.6  Policy 
In the presence of an unforeseen drain of reserves in the financial center, the severity of the 
decline in output is directly related to the scarcity in the stock of reserves available for 
purchasing debt. However, liquidity shocks have these effects only when the liquidity 
constraint is operative, i.e., when  t y y l - < + 2 2 1  holds. Moreover, the constraint on output is 
artificial in the sense that it is due only to a temporary lack of nominal liquidity that limits 
payments to factors of production (labor). 
In this section, I discuss two possible policies: an elastic currency regime, and a policy 
of restrictive lending. In the first case, I focus on a discount window that may be operated by  
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any of the monetary authorities
15. In the second case, I discuss the incentives that the monetary 
authority in the financial center may have to impose limitations on the flows of financial 
capital. 
3.6.1  An Elastic Currency Regime: a Discount Window 
In this section, I show the potential benefits of appropriate discount window activity. Consider 
a discount window that is operated as follows. In the first part of period t+1, the monetary 
authority lends fiat money
16 at some chosen short-run (within-period) gross interest rate  1 + t r  to 
the old bankers who can demonstrate that they are using the loan to purchase real bills (debt). 
When there is a common outside currency, the country where the debt was issued is irrelevant 
in the sense that all the debt is denominated in the same currency. An absence of arbitrage 
opportunities implies that 
(36)                 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 , 2 1 , 1







At the beginning of the second part of the period, old debtors arrive at their own 
country’s central island to repay their debt to the old bankers. The old bankers are then able to 
repay the monetary authority’s loan. Once the debt is repaid, the monetary authority can avoid 
inflationary pressures by removing from circulation the extra amount of fiat money lent to the 
old bankers. Notice that, if net transfers of fiat money across countries occurred when 
implementing this policy, some communication may be needed between the monetary 
authorities of both countries. In this event, either the other country’s monetary authority may 
directly remove the extra money from circulation or it may send the extra money to the other 
central island for its retirement. 
                                                 
15 For further discussion of alternative policies related to an elastic currency regime, see Freeman (1996 b), 
Freeman (1999) and Green (1999). 
16 The monetary authority could issue “gold certificates” instead, to be redeemed at the end of the period for 
money (gold). In this case, the gold certificates would be fully backed with gold by the monetary authority. For 
further discussion, see Freeman (1996 b).  
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It is important to note that, by choosing rt+1, the monetary authority determines the 
extent to which the liquidity constraint is binding
17. The lower rt+1 is, the weaker is the liquidity 
constraint at the world level. In the limit, when rt+1=1, the debt is sold at par, there is no 
liquidity constraint, and capital-based output cannot be increased further. Additionally, by 
setting rt+1=1 the Golden Rule allocation is attained. 
An example of a close enough policy but not as general is the suspension of the Bank 
Charter of 1844. As I mentioned before, this policy would allow the Bank of England to issue 
“uncovered” notes, a policy somehow close to an elastic currency regime. This policy was in 
operation during the crises of 1845 and 1856. 
3.6.2  Restrictive Lending by the Financial Center 
In this section, I show that a benevolent monetary authority in the financial center that cares 
only about its own residents has an incentive to implement capital controls. These incentives 
arise whenever the financial center is big enough: the center is not liquidity constrained in 
autarky
18 but the world economy is liquidity-constrained. In the remainder of this section, I 
assume that these conditions hold. 
The monetary authority in the center can impose restrictions on the transfers of reserves 
as follows. This authority forces the old bankers born in the center to buy debt at par from the 
old capitalists born in the center. Once enough reserves have been used in the center to buy all 
available debt at par domestically, the old bankers born in the center are permitted to transfer 
the rest of their balances of gold to Country 1’s central island, in which the debt is sold at a 
discount. 
                                                 
17 For an example of the implementation of this policy (in the absence of a central bank) in Canada during the 
period between 1880 and 1910, see Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996). They construct a model where seasonal 
variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a central role in generating banking panics and argue that 
these panics do not occur if private banks can issue bank notes backed by general assets. 
18 This is the case where  ) 1 ( 2 t y l - ‡  for all possible values of lt.  
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Events surrounding the crisis of 1836 provide an interesting example of the 
implementation of a policy of restrictive lending by the UK. Early in that year, the Bank of 
England was losing specie reserves at a rapid rate and the Governor of the Bank believed that 
the specie went to the US
19. The Bank of England responded to the gold outflow not only by 
raising its discount rate, but also by imposing quantitative controls. More specifically, the Bank 
of England restricted its loans to US by refusing to discount the bills of joint-stock banks or to 
handle acceptances of Anglo-American discount houses, even at the higher rates of interest
20. 
Why would the financial center’s economic authority want to implement such a policy? 
The grounds for this policy are in its implications in terms of welfare. Once this policy is 
implemented, the financial center reaches an allocation that, for the center’s capitalists and 
debtors replicates the Golden Rule, but that is superior to the Golden Rule, in welfare terms, for 
the center’s bankers
21. However, this welfare gain comes at the expense of some of the 
periphery’s agents: the capitalists are worse-off relative to both the Golden Rule and the 
integrated equilibrium
22, while the opposite is true for the owners of reserves (the bankers)
23. 
4  A World with Country-Specific Outside Currencies 
In this section, I consider an environment similar to the one described in Section 3, but with 
two main differences: each country has its own outside (fiat) currency and I allow the 
imposition of legal restrictions in the use of foreign exchange (foreign currency controls). 
Hence, the US’ outside currency is called dollars, and I let M1 be the nominal supply of dollars. 
The UK’s outside currency is called pounds, and M2 denotes the supply of pounds. In addition, 
there is a legal restriction in Country i (i=1,2) by which all possible transactions in Country i 
                                                 
19 The gold outflow that the Bank of England experienced in 1836 did not go to the United States, but it is not 
known where it went. See Temin (1969). 
20 See Temin (1969). 
21 Notice that, in the Golden Rule allocation, the bankers do not earn positive net profits. On the other hand, under 
a policy of restrictive lending by the financial center, the bankers born in this country earn positive net profits. 
22 However, they are better-off relative to autarky. 
23 The impact on the welfare of the periphery’s debtors is ambiguous.  
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must be performed and denominated using only Country i’s outside currency; no other currency 
can be used. The results can be easily extended to cases when there are different degrees of 
foreign currency controls
24. 
4.1  Trade and Travel Patterns 
The trade and travel patterns are affected by the presence of country-specific currencies and a 
legal restriction in the use of foreign exchange as a means of payment. The timing of travels 
and transactions remains unchanged relative to the one described in Section 3. However, the 
nature of some of the transactions will be modified as is described below. 
In the first part of a period, when young debtors issue debt for the nominal value of the 
amount of the good they want to purchase, the presence of a foreign currency control restricts 
the denomination of the debt. Thus, it matters if the debt issued in a given country is 
denominated in dollars or in pounds. 
In addition, the legal restriction in both countries and free labor mobility imply that 
young workers may need to carry a currency different than the one circulating in the country 
they are working at. The need for a different currency arises from the fact that young workers 
working abroad must perform transactions in specific domestic locations the next period. 
Therefore, the operation of an exchange market is required for trading outside currencies. After 
supplying labor and exchanging currency, young workers go back to their own islands with the 
outside currency they earned working. 
As before, a resale market for debt will open at the beginning of each period. However, 
the restrictions on the denomination of the debt along with restrictions on the use of foreign 
exchange determine that the old capitalists in a given central island accept only domestic 
                                                 
24 For the case of complete absence of restrictions in the use of foreign currency, it is easy to show that there will 
be international financial integration. However, the Kareken and Wallace (1981) result -the indeterminacy of the 
exchange rate- will hold.  
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currency in exchange for debt. This implies that both domestic and foreign old bankers must 
use only domestic currency to purchase debt. Thus, the operation of a foreign exchange market 
plays a crucial role in the sharing of reserves among countries. 
At the beginning of the second part of a period, the remaining debtors arrive at their 
own country’s central island and repay their debt to the old bankers using their own country’s 
outside currency. Next, all the old agents go back to their own islands and the competitive labor 
markets open. 
Finally, notice that the operation of a foreign exchange market is needed twice within a 
period. The first one relates to the operation of the international market for gold reserves at the 
beginning of the period. The second corresponds to the operation of the international labor 
market, during the second part of the period. 
4.2  Equilibrium and Optimality 
In equilibrium, the young capitalists born in the US accept the debt offered to them only if it is 
a promise of receiving dollars next period, since they must purchase labor using only dollars. 
Similarly, the young capitalists born in the UK only accept debt that promises pounds next 
period. Thus, due to the presence of full foreign currency controls in both countries, in 
equilibrium US’s debt is dollar-denominated and UK’s debt is pound-denominated. 
On the other hand, young workers born in the US (UK) work only for dollars (pounds), 
regardless of their location: the debtors must repay their debt using dollars (pounds) while the 
bankers must use dollars (pounds) to purchase labor. 
By Proposition 1, the old bankers born in the UK have an incentive to take reserves to 
the US’s central island. However, they must previously exchange their pounds for dollars (US’s 
old capitalists accept only dollars). Unfortunately, because of the combination of the lack of 
synchronicity (at the heart of the financial crises discussed in this paper) and the legal  
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restrictions on the means of payments to be used in both countries, at this time there are no 
agents in the US –the only dollar-holders- that will sell dollars for pounds. Therefore, no trade 
occurs in the exchange market at this stage
25, leading to financial autarky: UK’s old bankers are 
not able to take reserves to the financial periphery and there is no reserve-sharing. In addition, 
for the same reason, there is no trade in the exchange market when it opens again at the second 
part of this period either, precluding also labor mobility across countries. 
Thus, in the environment described, the presence of full foreign currency controls in a 
world of country-specific currencies leads to a lack of trade in the foreign exchange markets. 
The latter precludes financial integration, preventing the operation of an international market of 
reserves: the countries cannot share reserves anymore and country-specific reserves (the 
autarkic situation) displace international reserves. This equilibrium is the autarkic (closed 
economy) situation for both countries. 
Moreover, in this autarkic equilibrium, the resale price of the debt will not be equal 
across countries. In addition, due to the short supply of reserves in at least one of the countries, 
the debt will not be always sold at par in equilibrium. This causes a difference in the marginal 
rates of substitution across countries. Therefore, from Proposition 2, the autarkic equilibrium 
allocation does not maximize the steady-state utility for the world economy. 
4.3  The Effects of unanticipated drains of reserves from the 
United Kingdom 
This section  discusses the effects, in a  (stochastic) steady  state equilibrium with financial 
autarky, of an unforeseen drain of reserves from the UK (financial center) on both capital-based 
output and the real profits earned by the reserves-holding sector. Due to the  absence of 
                                                 
25 Due to the presence of foreign currency controls, the (shadow) exchange rate will be determined in the market. 
However, no one will trade at that exchange rate. For extensions of this case to similar environments, see Fujiki 
(2000).  
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financial integration, the results in this section will differ from the ones discussed in Section 
3.5. Once again, the analysis focuses on the consequences of innovations in lt, which represent 
unforeseen and unpredictable changes in the availability of reserves in the UK (financial 
center) at time t. 
The proofs for Propositions 5 and 6 follow directly from the proofs of Propositions 3 
and 4, and are not included here. 
Proposition 5 In the liquidity-constrained equilibrium with no financial integration, country-
specific outside currencies and full foreign currency controls, unforeseen drains of reserves 
from the financial center (innovations that reduce lt) do not affect capital-based output or 
gross real profits in the financial periphery. 
Proposition 6 In the liquidity-constrained equilibrium with no financial integration, country-
specific outside currencies and full foreign currency controls, unforeseen drains of reserves 
from the financial center (innovations that reduce lt) will reduce capital-based output but will 
increase gross real profits in the financial center. 
Thus, an unforeseen shock that reduces the availability of reserves in the UK (financial 
center) is confined to the UK in the absence of reserves-sharing, when there are country-
specific outside currencies and full foreign currency controls. This shock causes a reduction in 
capital-based output only in the UK, while the owners of gold-reserves in the UK benefit from 
this kind of shock. Notice that the results presented in this section are consistent with the 
historical evidence presented in Section 2 for the Greenback period. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper presents an environment in which common outside currencies and the absence of 
legal restrictions on foreign exchange use may help a financial periphery to (fully or partially)  
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overcome nominal constraints on output by allowing the sharing of reserves with a large 
financial center. However, financial integration also allows the transmission of liquidity shocks 
from the financial center to the periphery with consequences for real activity. Moreover, the 
analysis is consistent with the historical observations on financial crises in the United Kingdom 
and the United States during the Antebellum period. During this period, when both countries 
were on gold, we do observe that monetary and business contractions spread from the United 
Kingdom (the financial center) to the United States (the periphery). During these crises, the 
financial center will have incentives to implement a policy of restricting flows of specie. The 
events observed during the crisis of 1836 during the Antebellum period provide an example of 
the implementation of this kind of policy. An alternative to foreign financial dependence for the 
financial periphery is the development of its own central banking: the provision of the nominal 
means of payment needed via an elastic currency regime. The latter would be consistent with 
attainment of the Golden Rule when full liquidity is provided (that is: when the reserves are not 
in short supply). 
On the other hand, the presence of full foreign currency controls in a world of country-
specific currencies leads to an absence of trade in the exchange markets. This precludes 
financial integration and prevents the operation of a global market for reserves. The resulting 
equilibrium is autarkic. Such an environment replicates observations from the business 
contraction of 1866 (during the Greenback period), when the United States was off of gold. In 
the financial crisis of 1866, the monetary and business contraction that originated in the United 
Kingdom was confined to the United Kingdom. 
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